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This paper develops and tests a conceptual framework on the relationships between 
competition, time horizon and corporate social performance (CSP). We hypothesize that more 
intense competition discourages CSP by lowering the time horizon of companies. We test the 
hypothesis on a sample of 4696 of mainly small and medium-sized companies from twelve 
European countries. We distinguish between price competition, market position and 
technological competition. We find that companies with a longer time horizon have a higher 
CSP and that price competition and a ‘level playing field’ market position shorten the time 
horizon.  The intensity of technological competition has a positive effect on time horizon, but 
also exerts a direct positive influence on CSP. Test results show that time horizon 
significantly mediates the influence of price competition, the market position and 
technological competition on CSP. The analysis implies that, from the perspective of CSP, the 
economic policy of the government should not focus on fostering price competition, but rather 
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Recently, research into corporate social performance (CSP) has become more focused on the 
institutional roots of CSP (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Campbell, 2007; Matten and Moon, 
2008; Brammer et al., 2012). For example, Campbell (2007) provides a theoretical analysis of 
the economic and institutional conditions that make it more likely that companies act in 
socially responsible ways. One of the hypotheses that he develops is that the odds that 
companies will act in socially responsible ways depends on the level of competition they face. 
If competition is very intense, profit margins will be low and companies will have a strong 
incentive to save costs and this may cause them to act in socially irresponsible ways. Also van 
de Ven and  Jeurissen (2005) argue that intensive competition gives less room for companies 
to pursue a pro-active CSP. 
 Other theoretical studies have conceptualized CSP as resulting from a combination of 
external factors and internal factors, aiming to integrate the role of institutional conditions 
with internal factors that give rise to CSP (Brown, Vetterlein and Roemer-Mahler,2010; 
Young and Mackhija, 2013). One of the internal factors through which competition may 
affect CSP which is still underexposed in literature, is that competition may put pressure on 
the time horizon that the company employs in its strategic decision making. Because if 
companies are less profitable, they will have fewer resources and that makes it harder to make 
investments that pay off in the long term. The resulting ‘short-time thinking’ may discourage 
CSP. As Yong Oh et al. (2011) argue, CSP investments are most likely to pay off in the long 
run. Long-term oriented companies will therefore use CSP as an instrument to achieve long-
term success (Davis, 1973). In the short run, CSP might actually be a burden for the company. 
Companies with a short time horizon will therefore more likely view social investments as 
risky and uncertain and refrain from CSP investments. The benefits from investments in CSP, 
such as reduction of the risk of social or environmental incidents, reduction in production 
costs, increase in market share, improvement of reputation or increased access to capital 
market often become only visible after a considerable period of time. The longer the time 
horizon of the investor, the greater that investor is concerned about corporate reputation and 
the quality of stakeholder management (Rehbein et al., 2013). CSP will therefore be more 
valuable to companies with a long time horizon.  
One would expect that the links between competition, time horizon and CSP described 
above are particular relevant for small and medium-sized companies (SMEs). As SMEs are 
often operating on a level playing field, they face severe competition which puts profitability 
under pressure. Time, finances and a lack of skills and knowledge are commonly identified as 
constraints to CSP by SMEs (Studer et al. 2006). The long-term strategic benefits from CSP 
in terms of reputation, cost reduction, increased consumer demand and reduction in risks 
therefore often remain beyond the strategic horizon of SMEs. This implies that, like Lynch-
Wood and Williamson (2007) argue, the social license motive will not be sufficient to induce 
SMEs to go beyond compliance to the law. Also Spence et al. (2000) find that the possibilities 
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of a market-conform environmental policy are limited for the small entrepreneur, because the 
company will find it difficult to get its environmental efforts rewarded by the market. 
Therefore, one would expect that competition particularly puts limits on CSP of small 
companies by lowering the time horizon of strategic decision making. 
The preceding discussion ignores, however, the role of technological competition. In 
the current (scarce) literature on the relationship between the intensity of competition and 
CSP often no distinction is made between different types of competition. Market competition 
is about rivalry between companies and the instruments of rivalry may differ. Besides rivalry 
in prices, companies can also compete by innovation (Vickers, 1995). And just like price 
competition, also the intensity of technological competition may affect the time horizon of 
companies. In the current globalized economy, the world is constantly changing. Innovation 
leads to creative destruction which reduces the expected life time of companies and market 
relationships or at least make them more uncertain. Through this channel, the time horizon of 
companies may also decline. As a direct consequence, companies will employ a higher 
discount rate on future benefits (Bovenberg, 2002). This is a mechanism that may particularly 
affect large companies that are relatively more exposed to technological competition. 
Although it is plausible that market competition affects CSP through the time horizon 
of a company, there is no empirical research that provides evidence on this mediation path. 
There are some researches that show that time horizon and CSP are related (Slawinski and 
Bansal, 2009). For example, Berger et al. (2007) find that companies with the highest future 
orientation most likely follow a CSP approach that is sustained over time. Other research 
shows that the time horizon of the owners of the company affects CSP (Neuman and Zahra, 
2006; Mallin et al., 2013). For example, Yong Oh et al. (2011) find that investors with long-
term orientation support the company’s CSP initiatives. But the links between time horizon 
and the intensity of competition and how different types of competition affect CSP through 
time horizon is not researched yet. 
In this paper, we aim to fill this gap by (a) developing a conceptual framework that 
analyses how the price and technological competition affect long-term orientation of 
companies and how both affect CSP (b) estimating the framework on a sample of European 
companies that consists largely of SMEs. Given the present state of research, our paper makes 
three important contributions. First, we develop a conceptual framework that links price and 
technological competition to CSP by postulating a mediating role of time horizon. Second, we 
empirically test the model, thus providing insight into the quantitative effects of price and 
technological competition on time horizon and CSP and the role of time horizon as a 
mediation path between price and technological competition and CSP. The third contribution 
is that we test the model for both large, medium sized and small companies. For this purpose, 
we set out a large-scale survey among SMEs in Europe. The survey includes 4696 companies 
from twelve European countries, of which the majority of companies are small or medium-
sized. This provides us with an excellent sample to test the hypotheses of our conceptual 
framework for large, medium sized and small companies. 
 The content of the article is as follows. First, we present the conceptual framework and 
the hypotheses. Section 3 explains the data and describes some outcomes of the survey for 
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large, medium-sized and small companies. Section 4 presents the statistical analysis. Section 5 
discusses the main findings and section 6 derives some policy implications. 
 
2 Conceptual framework  
 
CSP is a concept that has existed in the literature for several decades (Carroll, 2008).
1
 It refers 
to “the company’s consideration of, and responses to, issues beyond the narrow economic, 
technical and legal requirements of the company” (Davis, 1973). Theoretical and empirical 
studies of the drivers of CSP have shown that CSP is influenced by a multitude of variables. 
Institutional theory has focused on the institutional roots of CSP that shape corporate 
decisions by giving rise to different competitive environments that affect the behavior of 
important external stakeholders of the company (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003; Campbell, 
2007; Matten and Moon, 2008; Brammer et al., 2012; Lee, 2011). Other theoretical studies 
have conceptualized CSP as resulting from a combination of external factors and internal 
factors, aiming to integrate the role of institutional conditions with internal factors that give 
rise to CSP. For example, Brown, Vetterlein and Roemer-Mahler (2010) distinguishes four 
sets of explanations of CSP that partly overlap with institutional analyses, but adds internal 
factors as well.  
Our analysis builds on the latter strand of literature that links external and internal 
conditions of CSP to CSP. In this section we introduce a conceptual framework for the 
relationship between competition as an external economic condition of CSP, long time 
horizon as an internal condition and CSP. We first explain why CSP depends on the time 
horizon of the company. Then we consider the effects of different types of competition on 
time horizon and how this may affect CSP of large and small companies differently.  
 
2.1 CSP and time horizon 
 
The time horizon of a company may affect CSP of companies because various types of 
benefits from engaging in CSP mainly pay off in the long term.  
One of the most important benefits is that CSP may foster the company’s reputation 
(Kurucz et al., 2008; Brønn and Vidaver-Cohen, 2008; Orlitzky, 2008; Laudall, 2011). 
Scandals and accidents can destroy reputations that often require a long time to build up. A 
strong CSP program can help reduce the probability of accidents that cause reputational 
damage or limit the reputational damage if they occur (Lougee et al., 2008). Since CSP may 
foster loyalty of customers and other stakeholders, it might also mitigate negative sanctions 
for the company’s accidental events such as product recalls (Fombrun et al. 2000). These 
reputational advantages typically pay off in the long run, because it takes time to build up a 
good reputation. Moreover, as CSP investments often carry with them a kind of insurance-
type protection in the sense of reducing business and corporate risks (Godfrey et al. 2009) and 
such unexpected events generally occur only now and then, the benefits of these investments 
appear only in the long term. Similarly, if a company sets up a stakeholder dialogue or a 
corporate philanthropy program from a risk management perspective (Godfrey, 2005), it will 
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take time before the company convinces its stakeholders that it is sincerely interested in CSP 
and before an improvement in reputation feeds into financial benefits from higher market 
shares, profit rates or other benefits. 
CSP is also of strategic value because it may contribute to process or product 
innovation (Wagner, 2007; Frondel et al., 2007; Halme and Laurila, 2009). Process innovation 
contributes to the reduction of costs in the long term and improves the (long term) financial 
performance of the company. For example, companies investing in pollution prevention may 
permanently reduce the costs for energy, waste, packaging and transportation. Hence, if a 
company decides to introduce an environmental management system, this may lead to a future 
stream of monetary savings on energy consumption, waste production or other costly ways of 
pollution. Similarly, CSP can improve the quality of the product, for example by reducing the 
energy costs of product use. This will help companies to differentiate themselves from their 
competitors with the aim of increasing sales and market share. But developing business 
opportunities due to consumers’ increasing demand for socially and environmentally friendly 
products often takes a long time (Dijk et al., 2013). And hence the value of investments in 
product innovation designed to augment the social or environmental quality of products to 
meet the increasing consumer’s demand for socially responsible products also exists in the 
long run. 
Furthermore, CSP may also be rewarded by potential employees and the current 
workforce. A good work climate may lead to more trust in the company, stronger 
commitment from employees, lower absenteeism and turnover rates, higher productivity, and 
a more positive attitude to work and good conduct (Sims and Keon, 1997; Turban and 
Greening, 1996). These social effects of CSP generate a permanent reduction in labor costs 
and increase in labor productivity and hence the payoff typically increases over time. 
A final strategic motive for CSP is that organizations that integrate CSP in their 
policies may be more successful to avoid excessive regulatory intervention and meet existing 
regulations (Lougee and Wallace, 2008). By operating at labor or environmental standards 
that meet or go beyond what is legally required, the company can also reduce the probability 
of fines (Hart, 1995). But, again, the pay-off of such insurance-type benefits are only 
significant if the company has a long time orientation. 
 Whereas the various types of benefits of CSP investments typically take substantial 
time to materialize, the costs associated with CSP are often immediate (Wang, 2013). CSP 
often requires spending significant financial and other resources in the short term, such as 
installing equipment (Hart, 1995; Brammer and Millington, 2008). A cost benefit analysis of 
such investments will only yield a positive result if the company focuses on the benefits after 
the short term. Hence, the longer the time horizon of the company, the more beneficial CSP 
will be and the greater the incentive to make investments that are costly in the short term but 
profitable in the long term (Graafland, 2002). We therefore posit the following hypothesis: 
 





2.2. Time horizon and price competition 
 
The time horizon that a company applies in its strategic decisions is not a given, but will 
depend on the market environment in which the company operates. One important factor 
influencing the market environment is the intensity of price competition. There are indeed 
several reasons why intense price competition may induce short-termism.  
First, fierce price competition puts a negative pressure on profitability and increases 
the risks of bankruptcy. As argued by Campbell (2007), if the continuity of the company is at 
risk because of low profit margins, there is a strong incentive to cut corners and save money 
where possible to survive in the short term, even if that causes the company to compromise on 
product quality or employee’s safety. Segelod (2000) finds that the scope for long-term 
investments decreases when profit is low, because companies need to have a sufficient cash-
flow to be able to develop their long-term projects and make them profitable.  
Second, low profitability leads to more dependency of external financers. If owners of  
SMEs have less resources available for long term investments, they become more dependent 
on credit from external financers like banks. This breakdown of long-term relationships 
between company and financer leads to loan monitoring that is more bottom-line oriented and 
increases the focus on short-term performance. External financers may undervalue 
investments that will pay off only in the long run (Laverty, 1996). Hence, external financial 
intermediares will put pressure on the management to be pragmatic and reap benefits as soon 
as possible.  
Based on this reasoning, we hypothesize that: 
 
H2 The intensity of price competition has a negative influence on time horizon. 
 
2.3 Time horizon and technological competition 
 
Besides price competition, companies also compete on innovation (Vickers, 1995). In the free 
market perspective of the Neo Austrian School of economic thought, economic growth does 
not result from price competition, but rather through creative destruction from the competition 
in introducing new customer goods, new technologies, sources of supply and new types of 
organizational structures (Schumpeter, 1976). According to Schumpeter, technological 
competition acts not only when in being, but also when it is merely an ever-present threat. 
Even if a company is the only supplier in a certain market segment, the possibility of 
competitors inventing a new product that replaces the monopolist product creates a 
competitive pattern that is very similar to perfect price competition (Schumpeter, 1976: 85). 
Technological competition occurs only when one technology can substitute for another within 
a certain market. That means, the pattern of substitution concerns substitution between two 
types of technology applicable to a certain set of uses. Often innovations are incremental, but 
the accumulation of incremental innovations in operations and design processes may have the 
same creative destructive impact as major innovation.  
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Also technological competition may reduce the time horizon of companies 
(Bovenberg, 2002). In a dynamic market environment, companies may face a sudden decline 
in market share and even bankruptcy if other companies introduce new products that make 
existing products out-fashioned or obsolete. Creative destruction thus increases the 
uncertainty and risks and reduces the expected life time and this may induce short-termism in 
the company as well as in the financial market that provides the company with financial 
means. Although most investment professionals recognize that discounted cash flow is the 
appropriate model for valuing equities, they may believe that estimating distant cash flows is 
too speculative to be useful (Rappaport, 2005).  
Technological competition may, however, also induce or even require a longer time 
horizon. As the development of new technology takes a long time and needs a long time to 
reach break-even, companies that face severe technological competition are forced to consider 
long-term effects of their investment decisions (Miller and Friesen, 1982). Segelod (2000) 
refers to research that shows that the development of a new type of product or technology 
takes 8 years on average to reach break-even and 12 years to achieve the same profitability as 
the old business. Companies with a short time horizon will be less prepared to make this kind 
of investments and are therefore less able to survive in a dynamic market context where only 
companies that innovate succeed (Schumacher et al., 2013).  
The influence of technological competition on time horizon is therefore ambiguous 
and to be determined by empirical research. Based on these arguments, we posit the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H3 The influence of the intensity of technological competition on time horizon is 
ambiguous. 
 
2.4 The role of company size 
 
As argued in the introduction, it is likely that CSP, time horizon and competition differ for 
small and large companies. The link between competition, time horizon and CSP may thus 
offer an explanation why CSP is dependent on the size of the company. 
  First, as small companies tend to be more subject to intense price competition than 
large companies, the competitive environment lowers the time horizon of small companies 
and this will consequently reduce their CSP. 
Company size may also affect the time horizon of the company directly. SMEs are 
often privately owned and managed by their owners (Spence, 1999; Jenkins, 2009). Empirical 
research by Neubaum and Zahra (2006) suggests that the presence and salience of institutional 
long-term ownership promote corporate support for engaging in socially responsible 
activities. Family businesses are often characterized by inward orientation, long-term 
commitment, superior employee care and loyalty, long tenure of leadership (Flören, 1998) and 
exhibiting a strong religious/philanthropic approach to CSP (Jamali et al., 2008; Laudal, 
2011). The policies of the family business tend to reflect the values of the managers (Lepoutre 
and Heene, 2006; Murillo and Lozano, 2006). Thus, the personal preference of top 
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management/owners is the most influential factor affecting the type and extent of SMEs’ CSP 
policy (EC, 2002). One would therefore expect that small companies have a longer time 
horizon than large companies. Moreover, one could argue that SMEs are more long-term 
oriented because they are less exposed to capital markets. As Williamson et al. (2006) state: 
‘SMEs, being […] without analysts and shareholders fixated by price/earnings ratios, are 
better placed than major corporates to take advantage of the fact that society and the media 
revere qualities such as honesty, integrity and the ability to say sorry’. In contrast, large 
companies are today much more pressured by fluid and impatient capital. The average 
holding period for stocks until the mid-1960s was about seven years. Today it is less than a 
year in professionally managed funds (Rappaport, 2005). 
  Finally, company size may affect CSP for other reasons than intensity of price 
competition or time horizon. Because of their small size, small companies attract less 
attention from societal organizations, such as media and NGOs, than large companies (Jamali 
et al., 2008; Laudal, 2011). They are just too small to be visible. This might diminish 
responsiveness to CSP of various stakeholders on the capital, product and labor market and 
reduce the potential of strategic benefits of CSP for small companies. Small companies 
therefore reap less reputational benefits of CSP and this generates a direct positive 
relationship between CSP and company size. Another difference is that SMEs are often 
organized on an informal basis and so are their CSR policies. Jamali et al. (2008) note that 
many scholars suggest that SMEs are even often unknowingly socially responsible. Graafland 
et al. (2003) find that large Dutch companies have more need of and hence make more use of 
instruments that foster the transparency of companies, like a code of conduct, ISO 
certification and social reporting. Furthermore, due to their small size, CSR instruments are 
relatively costly for SMEs. Large firms can spread the costs of CSR over a substantial larger 
turnover. 
 Based on this discussion, we pose two hypotheses on the relationship between company 
size and CSP and time horizon respectively: 
 
H4 Company size has a positive influence on CSP. 
 
H5 Company size has a negative influence on time horizon. 
 
2.5 Conceptual framework and mediation 
 
Based on the five hypotheses developed above, we propose the conceptual framework 
depicted in Figure 1. Figure 1 also sheds light on the possibility of mediation. Mediation is a 
hypothesized causal chain between three variables, in which the relation between two 
variables decomposes through a third called the mediator (Baron and Kenny, 1986). The first 
variable affects the mediator and the mediator affects the second. The conceptual framework 
potentially implies two types of mediation by time horizon. First, mediation of the 
relationship between price competition and CSP by time horizon occurs if hypothesis 1 and 
hypothesis 2 are both confirmed. Similarly, mediation of the relationship between 
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technological competition and CSP by time horizon is obtained if both hypothesis 1 and 
hypothesis 3 are confirmed. Based on this, we posit two additional hypotheses: 
 
H6 Time horizon mediates the relationship between the intensity of price competition and 
CSP. 
 
H7 Time horizon mediates the relationship between the intensity of technological 
competition and CSP. 
 
Besides these indirect effects of competition on CSP through mediation by time horizon, we 
also test for direct effects of price competition and technological competition on CSP that are 
not mediated by time horizon but caused by other effects.  
 




Finally, the relationships between competition, time horizon and CSP are controlled for 
various other company characteristics. First, we control for the company’s position in the 
chain. Public campaigns are particularly effective if the targeted company is sensitive to 
public reputation (Brown et al., 2010). Companies with direct consumer relations and 
especially those with brands that they want to protect are therefore particular vulnerable to 
public advocacy campaigns and more inclined to pursue an active CSP policy. Second, CSP is 
conditioned on the culture and wider institutional environment of the company (De Geer, 
Borglund and Frostenson, 2010; Matten and Moon, 2008). This implies that CSP may depend 
on the region where the company is located. Also the time horizon may depend on the region. 
For example, UK companies have often been thought to invest in a more short-term manner 






















the company operates. The nature of the production processes or products determines the 
extent of social and environmental externalities that a company creates (Brown et al., 2010; 
Brammer and Pavelin, 2006). 
 
3 Survey description 
 
In this section we describe the measurement of the dependent and independent variables and 




To collect data, we developed a survey for large companies and SMEs. The survey was sent 
to about 365000 companies in twelve European countries (Denmark, Finland, Sweden, The 
Netherlands, Germany, France, Austria, Hungary, Poland, Italy, and Spain). 13637 
respondents responded to the survey (response percentage 3.7%) of which 4696 completed the 
survey. This relatively low response rate is in line with ex-ante expectations, because the 
survey is electronic and takes relatively substantial effort to fill in, particularly for small 
companies. 
Before setting out the surveys, we first pre-tested it by interviewing ten executives 
from companies in various sectors. The aim of the interviews was to explore measures and 
terms to be used to measure the various factors in order to secure content validity. If the 
interviewees did not understand the questions or measures, we had the opportunity to seek, in 
interaction with the interviewees, for other formulations for the same concept. In this way, we 
avoided vague questions that could lead to misinterpretation by the respondents.  
For the measurement of CSP, we used an average score based on 76 indicators per 
company which can be grouped into three types of sub-scores on the use of CSP related 
organizational instruments and the contribution to the environmental and social dimensions of 
CSP. We thus focus on the social and environmental dimensions of CSP, leaving out the 
economic dimension. Table 1 shows in more detail the measures that were included, as well 
as the mean and standard deviation of the CSP indices. 
The first scale refers to general organizational measures or instruments that can be 
used to integrate CSP in the company’s organization (Ulrich et al., 1998; Graafland et al., 
2003). The second and third scales refer to six social and six environmental aspects of CSR 
respectively. The environmental aspects concern variables that affect climate change and (the 
conservation of) natural resources. While environmental aspects are considered to prevail in 
the CSP debate, the social dimension is perceived to be comparatively underexposed. The six 
aspects that we investigate relate to various quality of job dimensions, namely gender 
equality, diversity and non-discrimination, work organisation and work-life balance, skills and 
life-long learning, health and working conditions, and respect of human rights in the supply 
chain. For each aspect, the survey included questions on three procedural instruments that 
facilitate the organization of accountability in the company (which is an important aspect of 
AA 1000), a question on the effort to improve the performance in the respective issue and the 
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realization of improvements in each social and environmental aspect during the period 2007-
2010. The procedural measures that enable the management of CSP are (1) measurement of 
the actual performance, (2) whether the company uses targets for the improvement in 
performance in the future, and (3) whether it reports the realization of these targets (RARE, 
2006). The reason why we added the question on effort is that our pilot interviews indicated 
that SMEs may actually pro-actively foster their CSP without using formal procedures or 
programs that are more often used by large companies. Merely measuring the use of formal 
instruments to implement CSP may therefore bias the measurement of the actual 
implementation of CSP by SMEs.  
 
Table 1 Construction of CSP (sub)indices
a
 
Index Unweighted average of scores on: Mean SD 
  All Small Medium Large All 
CSP 
instruments 
internal code, external code, dialogue with NGOs, 
cooperation in supply chain, partnerships, 
participation in local initiatives, director is 
answerable to CSP, CSP related remuneration, 
confidential person, ethics committee, CSP training, 
reference guide, membership global initiatives, 
ISO9001, ISO14001, SA8000, Other certifications 
27 22 32 47 20 
Social aspects women in board, recruitment disadvantaged 
workers, work life balance, employee training, work 
accidents, working conditions suppliers 
43 41 46 51 11 
Environmental 
aspects 
CO2 emission, energy consumption, water 
consumption, waste production, environmental 
conditions suppliers 
12 10 15 23 15 
Overall CSP   
27 25 31 39 12 
a
 All sub-indices are scaled to the range from 0 (lowest value) to 100 (highest value).  
 
In order to reduce the potential for social desirability bias, we explained to the 
respondents in an accompanying letter that the questionnaire was confidential and to be used 
for research purposes only. The identity of the participants would remain anonymous. The 
executives who filled in the questionnaire thus had little reason to present a more favorable 
picture of themselves than they knew was the case. In a study on pro-environmental behavior, 
Kaiser, Wölfing, and Fuhrer (1999) showed that people are only marginally tempted to give 
socially desirable answers. Also other studies show that self-reported behavior and actual 
behavior are strongly correlated (see, e.g., Fuj, Hennesy, and Mak, 1985; Warriner, 
McDougall, and Claxton, 1984; Bernard, 2000).  
We collected our data using a single survey instrument and a single respondent per 
survey. To address the potential concerns of common method bias and common source bias, 
we used several procedural remedies (Podsakoff, Mackenzie, Lee and Podsakoff, 2003). We 
protected respondents’ privacy by assuring them complete anonymity in our cover letter. We 
reduced item ambiguity by avoiding vague concepts, keeping the questions simple and pre-
testing the survey with executives. Moreover, we carried out Harman’s one-factor test. If a 
substantial amount of common method bias exists in data, a single or general factor that 
accounts for most of the variance will emerge if all the variables are entered together 
(Podsakoff et al., 2003). An unrotated principal component analysis on all the variables in our 
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analysis revealed 16 factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.0, which together accounted for 
71% of the total variance. The largest factor did not account for a majority of the variance 
(11.7 %).  
Finally, because of the relatively low response rate and possible non-response bias, we 
cannot assume that the outcomes are representative for all companies in the twelve European 
countries. In order to evaluate the non-response bias, we used wave analysis which assumes 
that late respondents are more similar to non-respondents than early respondents (Lin & Ho, 
2011). For this purpose, we constructed a dummy variable with value 1 for respondents that 
responded to the first round, value 2 for responses after the first reminder, value 3 for 
responses after the second reminder and value 4 for responses after the third reminder. 
Bivariate regression analysis showed that the (Spearman) correlation coefficient between this 
dummy and the CSP of companies is insignificant (-0.012 with p=0.39).  
The outcomes reported in Table 1 indicate a positive link between company size and 
CSP. For all three sub-indices, large companies (>250 FTEs) have a higher score than 
medium-sized companies (50-250 FTEs) and medium-sized companies perform better than 
small companies (<50 FTEs). 
 
3.2 Time horizon and competition 
 
Table 2 reports the sample mean and standard deviation for time horizon and competition. For 
time horizon, we used two questions: ‘What is the average time horizon of the financial 
targets of your company?’ and ‘CSP may demand extra financial resources. What is the 
average time horizon for these investments for your company?’. On average, the time horizon 
is about 2.5 years. If we compare small, medium-sized and large companies, the outcomes 
indicate a positive link between time horizon and company size.  
 










2.62 2.52 2.75 2.97 1.32 
 CSP 
2.79 2.67 2.81 2.96 1.37 
Competition
a
 Intensity of price competition 
5.07 5.14 5.10 4.76 1.88 
 Intensity of technological competition 
5.19 5.09 5.38 5.28 1.67 
Market 
position 
Market leader (%) 
16 11 21 39  
 Following the market leader  (%) 
10 8 14 17  
 Level playing field (%) 
53 54 55 36  
 Niche market (%) 
20 26 10 8  
a
 Mean response to 7 point scale ranging from: ‘not at all’(1) to ‘very much’(7).  
 
We measure the intensity of price by the response to the statement: ‘In the market for your 
main product or service, your enterprise is prone to price competition’. The intensity of 
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technological competition was measured by the response to the statement: ‘In the market for 
your main product or service, your enterprise is prone to competition on quality and/or 
product innovation’. The questions were administered on a Lickert scale ranging from not at 
all (1) to very much (7). The average response equals 5.08 for price competition (with 
standard deviation of 1.88) and 5.19 for technological competition (with standard deviation 
1.67). As expected, large companies experience more intense technological competition and 
less intense price competition than small companies. Besides price competition, we also 
inquired the market position of the company, as this may provide additional indirect 
information on the degree of price competition. Companies that are operating on a level 
playing field will be more subject to price competition than market leaders or companies 
operating in a niche market. In our sample, most companies stated that they operate on a level 
playing field. This concerns particularly small and medium-sized companies. The second 
largest group consists of companies operating in a niche market. This particularly concerns 
small companies. Furthermore, as expected, market leaders (the third largest group in our 
sample) concern relatively more large companies. Finally, 10% of the companies characterize 
themselves as following the market leader. 
 
3.3  Company size and control variables 
 
The distributions of the size of the company, its position in the chain, the region and the sector 
are reported in Table 3 (see below). 91% of the sample consists of SMEs. However, because 
of the large number of companies in our sample, we have still about 500 large companies with 
more than 250 employees in our sample. Companies in our sample mostly operate in business 
to business (B2B) relations. Only 7 % of our sample mainly or only sells to end consumers. 
With respect to regions, Table 3 shows that many respondents are from Mediterranean 
Europe. This is due to the large number of Italian companies to which the survey was sent as 
Italy traditionally have many SMEs compared to other countries. In contrast, for the UK we 
received a relatively low number of responses. We distinguish 19 sectors based on the 
National Accounts classification. Most companies operate in manufacturing sectors, but a 
substantial part of 37% concerns service industries. 
 
4 Empirical analysis 
 
This section describes the results of the empirical analysis. First, we use bivariate correlation 
analysis to investigate the correlation between the (in)dependent variables. Next, we use 
multiple regression analysis to test the hypotheses. Third, we determine the significance of the 
mediation paths. 
 Before performing statistical analysis, we tested for heteroskedasticity and outliers. 
Cross plots between CSP and the time horizon and competition variables showed no 
heteroskedasticy, whereas box plots indicated no problematic outliers. Given the fact that our 
sample is very large, multivariate normality should not pose serious problems. We therefore 
use ordinary least squares for the multiple regression analysis. 
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Table 3 Company size and control variables (% of respondents) 




























Continental Western Europe: Austria, France, 
Germany, The Netherlands 
31 
Mediterranean Europe: Italy, Spain 39 East Europe: Hungary, Poland 13 
Scandinavia: Denmark, Finland, Sweden 14   
Sector division 
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 
2.2 
Electricity, gas and water supply 
1.1 




Manufacture of food products, beverages 
and tobacco 4.2 
Trade and hotels and restaurants 
8.7 




Manufacture of paper, publishing and 
printing 2.2 
Telecommunications and computer services 
4.4 












Manufacture of transport equipment 
.7 
Other business activities 
12.3 
Other manufacturing 
8.8   
  
 
4.1 Bivariate correlation analysis 
 
Table 4 reports the outcomes of bivariate correlation analysis between CSP, time horizon, 
price competition, technological competition and company size. Table 4 shows that CSP is 
positively correlated with time horizon, technological competition, market leader and market 
follower position and company size and negatively correlated to level playing field and nice 
market position. The two measures for time horizon are highly correlated. Furthermore, time 
horizon is negatively correlated to price competition, but tends to be positively correlated to 
technological competition. Also the market position is significantly correlated to time horizon, 
companies that operate on a level playing field having a significantly shorter time horizon 




Table 4 Results of bivariate correlation analysis
a
 
 CSP Time horizon Competition 
  Financial CSP Price Technological 
CSP 1     
Time horizon: financial .18** 1    
Time horizon: CSP .12** .49** 1   
Price competition .00 -.07** -.08** 1  
Technological competition .11** .05** .02 .06** 1 
Market leader .16** .07** .05** -.12** -.01 
Market follower .07** .02 .00 -.00 .02 
Level playing field -.08** -.03* -.02 .15** -.01 
Niche player -.10** -.01 .01 -.08** .01 
Company size (natural log) .40** .12** .08** -.06** .06** 
a
 Spearman’s rho. * p<0.01; ** p<.001 
 
Price competition is significantly correlated with technological competition, but the 
correlation coefficient is very small, indicating that these variables are indeed measuring very 
different types of competition. As Schumpeter (1976: 105) remarks, the introduction of new 
methods of production and new commodities is hardly conceivable with perfect price 
competition, because price competition is always temporarily suspended whenever anything 
new is being introduced. And vice versa perfect price competition may hamper technological 
competition because the lack of excess profits makes it harder to invest in innovation. As 
expected, price competition is substantially correlated to the market position of the company, 
market leaders and nice players facing relatively a low intensity of price competition and 
companies operating in a level playing field experiencing a relatively high intensity of price 
competition. For technological competition, we find no significant correlations with market 
position. Finally, in line with prior expectations, price competition is negatively correlated to 
company size, whereas for technological competition we find a significant positive correlation 
coefficient. 
The high correlation between the two types of time horizon of .49 (which is equivalent 
to the so-called inter-item coefficient) suggests that they can be combined in one factor. 
Robinson, Shaver, and Wrightsman (1991) have five categories of reliability for the inter-item 
coefficient: none, minimal, moderate, extensive, and exemplary. They suggest that scores 
below .10 are deemed minimal, .10 to .19 moderate, .20 to .29 extensive, and scores above .30 
are seen as exemplary. Given the high inter-item coefficient between financial and CSP time 
horizon, we can classify the factor time horizon as reliable. We also used confirmatory factor 
analysis to analyze whether we could cluster the two measures of time horizon. Cronbach’s 
alpha of 0.66 indeed exceeds the lower limit of 0.60 (Hair, Anderson & Black, 1998). Based 
on the high and significant correlation coefficients, the confirmation of internal consistency 
by Cronbach’s alpha and the good content coverage, we decided to use the factor time horizon 
in the multiple regression analysis.  
 Furthermore, we assessed the consistency of price competition and level playing field. 
The correlation coefficient of .15 indicates moderate reliability. Cronbach’s alpha equals .14 
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which indicates insufficient internal consistency. This indicates that market position captures 
more dimensions than merely the intensity of price competition. Hence, although the two 
measures are clearly theoretically and empirically related, we decided not to use them in one 
factor. 
 
4.2 Multivariate regression analysis 
 
The estimation results for the regression analysis are presented in Table 5. In order to test for 
multi-collinearity, we examined the variance inflation factor (VIF) (Hair et al., 1998). For 
each variable we checked that the variance inflation factor was smaller than five, which was 
met in all cases. This implies that multi-collinearity is not a major problem. 
The first column presents the estimation results for time horizon. The regression 
analysis shows that time horizon is significantly negatively related to the intensity of price 
competition, confirming hypothesis 2. Compared to market leaders (which is taken as the 
reference dummy), companies following the market leader and operating on a level playing 
field have a relatively short time horizon. The time horizon is shortest for companies 
operating on a level playing field, providing further indication that price competition 
negatively affects time horizon. The degree of technological competition has a small but 
significant positive effect on time horizon. Also company size has a significant positive effect 
on time horizon. We therefore have to reject hypothesis 5. For the control variables, we find 
that time horizon is longer for companies that supply directly to end consumers in comparison 
to companies operating in B2B relations. Furthermore, taking the UK as reference, we find 
that companies from Scandinavia and Continental Europe have a relatively long time horizon, 
whereas the time horizon for companies from Eastern Europe and Mediterranean Europe do 
not significantly differ from that of companies from the UK. Furthermore, we find some 
sectoral differences (with the category ‘other business’ taken as reference sector).  
The estimation results in the second column show that hypothesis 1, that companies 
with a longer time horizon have a higher CSP, is confirmed. The coefficient is highly 
significant (p<.001). Furthermore, we find that company size has a direct significant positive 
effect on CSP, confirming hypothesis 4. For the control variables, we find that CSP is 
significantly related to the company’s position in the chain. Furthermore, we find that 
companies from Anglo Saxon countries in Europe have a significantly higher CSP than 
companies from other regions in Europe, while also some sectoral effects are detected.  
We do not find any significant direct influence from price competition on CSP. Also if 
we add price competition squared to test for non-linearity in the relationship between price 
competition and CSP, both coefficients appear to be highly insignificant. But we do find some 
direct effects of market position: companies operating on a level playing field significantly 
perform less than market leaders. In contrast, technological competition has a positive and 





Table 5 Results of multiple regression analysis
a
 
 Time horizon CSR  
Time horizon  .122*** 
Price competition -.039** .015 
Technological competition .035* .082*** 
Market follower -.036* -.037* 
Level playing field -.064** -.086*** 
Niche player -.035 -.069*** 
Company size (natural log) .081*** .362*** 
B2C .050** .049** 
Scandinavia .085* -.154*** 
Continental Europe .168*** -.144*** 
East Europe .033 -.076** 
Mediterranean Europe .066 -.074 
Agriculture .065*** .010 
Mining .042** .010 
Food .045** .017 
Textile -.012 -.012 
Paper .002 .029* 
Oil & Chemical .017 .035* 
Metal .010 .006 
Machine -.008 -.038* 
Transport .024 .004 
Other manufacturing .020 .013 
Electricity. gas & water .071*** .032* 
Construction -.020 -.004 
Trade & hotels .008 -.021 
Transport services .042** .018 
Telecommunications -.018 -.027 
Finance .008 -.024 
Real estate .036* -.005 
Other services -.040 -.010 
R2 .055 .205 
F 9.421*** 40.178*** 
a
 Standardized coefficients; * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<.001 
 
4.3 Significance of mediation effect by time horizon 
 
In order to test the mediating role of the time horizon in the relationship between competition 
and CSP, we followed Zhao et al. (2010) and use the bootstrap estimation technique provided 
by Preacher and Hayes (2008) to provide reliable estimates of the significance of the 
mediation paths hypothesized in our framework. Table 6 shows that the indirect effect of price 
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competition on CSP through mediation by time horizon is significant, confirming hypothesis 
6. However, its absolute magnitude is relatively small. For technological competition we find 
a significant positive mediation path, confirming hypothesis 7, but again the absolute 
magnitude of the indirect effect through time horizon on CSP is small. The mediation effects 
for market position are more substantial. Finally, company size has a significant positive 
effect on CSP mediated by time horizon. Overall, the results confirm that time horizon is a 
relevant mediator. 
 









Level field Niche player Company size 
-.04* .03* -.20* -.20* -.15 .08* 
a
 Unstandardized coefficients. For the indirect effects, the bootstrap estimates are reported, using 1000 bootstrap 
samples.* indicates that the bias corrected confidence interval (at 95%) does not include 0, which means that 




In this paper, we analyze the relationship between competitiveness, time horizon and CSP. 
The conceptual framework starts with the notion that the benefits of CSP only materialize in 
the longer run, while the costs associated with CSP are often immediate. A company that 
focusses on short term profitability will therefore not be inclined to invest in CSP related 
activities, as the future benefits of CSP are too much discounted. Hence, the longer the time 
horizon, the higher the CSP of a company will be. The time horizon of a company is an 
important internal factor of CSP. Institutional theory has, however, stressed that internal 
processes and motivations of CSP relate to broader socio-political regulatory processes. One 
of these conditions is the intensity of competition (Campbell, 2007). Companies supplying in 
non-branded, price sensitive consumer markets face higher risks when implementing CSP of 
which the revenues only accrue in the long run, because any short-term cost disadvantage will 
harm their market share (Van de Ven and Jeurissen, 2005). Furthermore, if companies are 
operating on a market where price competition is very fierce, the profit margins will tend to 
be low. Slack resources theory predicts that the availability of slack (financial and other) 
resources provides a company with more opportunity to invest in CSP (Waddock and Graves, 
1997). Combining the effect of price competition on time horizon and the effect of time 
horizon on CSP leads to the hypothesis that the negative influence of price competition on 
CSP is mediated by time horizon.  
Based on a large sample of 4696 companies from twelve European countries, we find 
that the two hypotheses on the relationship between time horizon and CSP and between price 
competition and time horizon are confirmed: price competition has a significant negative 
influence on the time horizon that a company applies in its investment decisions, whereas 
time horizon is found to exert a significant positive effect on CSP. Estimation results 
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furthermore confirm the hypothesis that time horizon significantly mediates the influence of 
price competition on CSP. The magnitude of the mediated effect is, however, relatively small.  
However, also the market position of the company significantly affects time horizon. 
Particularly companies operating on a level playing field, that face more intensive price 
competition than companies with a market leader position, are found to have a significantly 
shorter time horizon than market leaders. Also the mediation of the influence of (level playing 
field) market position on CSP through time horizon appears to be significant. Insofar we can 
interpret the level playing field market position as an indicator for the intensity of market 
competition (that possible corrects for measurement errors in the direct measurement of the 
intensity of price competition), these results provide further indication that the intensity of 
price competition has an adverse effect on time horizon and that time horizon mediates the 
negative influence of price competition on CSP. However, it is also possible that the influence 
of market position on CSP reflects other mechanisms than price competition and that are not 
captured by company size or the other control variables.  
Studies on the relationship between the intensity of competition and CSP have until 
now only focussed on price competition. Besides price, also innovation is an important 
instrument of rivalry. The bivariate correlation analysis shows that the correlation between the 
intensity of price competition and technological competition is relatively small, confirming 
that they represent different types of rivalry. The intensity of technological competition may 
affect CSP through time horizon. Theoretically it is not obvious whether the degree of 
technological competition increases or decreases the time horizon, since there are arguments 
for both types of influences. Our estimation results show that the positive effects dominate but 
the magnitude of the effect is small. Estimation results of the mediation path confirm the 
hypothesis that time horizon significantly mediates the influence of technological competition 
on CSP.   
Furthermore, we find that CSP is related to company size. In our model, this 
relationship is threefold. First, there is an indirect effect through competition. As the bivariate 
correlation coefficients in section 4.1 show, small companies face significantly more intense 
price competition and less intense technological competition than large companies. As price 
competition diminishes time horizon and technological competition increases time horizon, 
the combination of these effects imply that company size has a positive influence on time 
horizon through competition.  
Second, we also find a significant direct positive effect of company size on time 
horizon. This is contrary to our hypothesis that company size exerts a negative influence on 
time horizon. A possible explanation is that the size of the company is related to unobserved 
characteristics of the company, such as operational efficiency (which also partly explains why 
large companies have grown larger and small companies have not). As a result, large 
companies may have more resources than small companies, even if they are subject to a 
similar intensity of price competition. Because of these slack resources, they are more able to 
apply a long-time horizon on the return on investments. 
Besides time horizon, we also detect a direct positive effect of company size on CSP. 
As discussed in the theoretical section, a possible explanation is that small companies attract 
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less attention from societal organizations, such as media and NGOs, than large companies 
(Jamali et al., 2008; Laudal, 2011). This will diminish responsiveness to CSP of various 
stakeholders on the capital, product and labor market of small companies and reduce the 
potential of strategic benefits of CSP for small companies. Furthermore, as shown in Table 1, 
SMEs make less use of CSP related instruments, either because they do not need formal 
instruments because of their small size or because CSR instruments are relatively costly for 
SMEs.  
Regarding the other control variables, we find that companies operating in business to 
consumer relations have a better CSP than companies in business to business relations. On top 
of this direct influence, the position in the chain also affects CSP indirectly by fostering a 
longer time horizon. A possible explanation is that companies that are directly consumer-
facing are more vulnerable to reputation damage from concerns related to their products and 
therefore are more aware of the importance of long-term policies that diminish the risk of 
such events. Furthermore, companies from the UK tend to have a relatively short time horizon 
in comparison to companies from Scandinavia and Continental Europe. This is in line with 
previous research that indicates more pressure from stock markets in Anglo Saxon countries 
forcing managers to give priority to short-term profit (Segelod, 2000). Still, companies from 
the UK outperform companies from other European countries with regard to CSP. The 
interpretation of this result is complicated, because the regional dummies may capture several 
different types of influences, such as culture and political and legal institutions, such as laws 
on corporate governance (Aguilera and Jackson, 2003). For the sectoral influences, we find 
that utilities and agriculture have both a relatively long time horizon, whereas utilities and the 
energy sector show a relatively high level of CSP. This can be explained by the predominance 
of externalities in the production and consumption of energy. 
 Besides the effects hypothesized by the conceptual framework, we find some other 
significant relations that are not predicted by our model. In particular, we also detect a 
significant negative direct effect of a level playing field market position and a significant 
positive direct effect of technological competition on CSP. As Zhao et al. (2010) argue, 
empirical evidence of a (non-hypothesized) direct effect has heuristic value for theory 
building. There are indeed several possible explanations of these additional findings. First, if 
companies operate on a level playing field that put downward pressure on their profit margins, 
this might not only affect their time horizon but also directly affect their CSP. As argued by 
Campbell (2007) and others (Orlitzky et al., 2003, Waddock and Graves, 1997), companies 
that have lower profitability have fewer resources available for socially responsible activities 
than companies that are more profitable and it might very well be that this slack resource 
effect is operative independently from the effect of low profitability on time horizon. Another 
argument is the ‘noblesse oblige’ view which argues that financial performance may be a 
precursor of CSP because organizational success may create a sense of obligation among 
executives to give back to the community (Orlitzky, 2008).  
The positive direct effect of the intensity of technological competition can be 
explained by the responsiveness of stakeholders on the product and capital market to the CSP 
of the company. Rivalry in innovation poses a serious potential threat to the company’s sales 
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or profitability, because under such conditions customers and suppliers can more easily shift 
to other companies and hence will face low costs to boycott the company (Glazer et al., 2010), 
creating an incentive to higher CSP. As a derivative effect, also financers on the capital 
market have a higher incentive to consider the CSP of companies in their investment 
decisions. More competition will therefore enforce responsiveness to CSP on the product and 
capital market. Second, in a business environment with intense technological competition, 
innovation is conceded to be essential for survival. But it may also provide a positive impulse 
to CSP, as CSP may be a qualitative means to distinguish the company from other companies 
(Wagner, 2007; Frondel et al., 2007). Several studies indeed find that CSP is positively 
related to innovation (Hull and Rothenberg, 2008; McWilliams and Siegel, 2000). CSP can 
also be an alternative to innovation for companies to differentiate themselves from others and 
raise their profitability (Klein and Dawar, 2004; Hull and Rothenberg, 2008). Finally, the 
direct effect of technological competition on CSP may point at possible positive effects from 
technological competition on innovation and from innovation on CSP. Previous research has 
shown that general innovation can have a positive effect on the adoption of voluntary 
environmental programs because innovative firms are already engaged in improving 
production processes and products and therefore have overcome management barriers and 
therefore are more likely to be capable of undertaking organizational changes and absorbing 
new costs in relation to CSP (Ziegler and Nogareda, 2009). As a result, since technological 
competition may stimulate innovation, it might also have an effect on CSP.  
 
6 Summary and policy implications 
  
In this paper we develop and test seven hypotheses on the relationship between competition, 
time horizon and CSP. Based on a sample of 4696 European companies, of which the 
majority concerns SMEs, six out of seven hypotheses are confirmed: (1) long time horizon 
fosters CSP; (2) time horizon depends negatively on the intensity of price competition; (3) 
time horizon depends positively on the intensity of technological competition; (4) CSP is 
positively related to company size; (5) time horizon mediates the influence of price 
competition on CSP; (7) time horizon mediates the influence of technological competition on 
CSP. The fifth hypothesis that company size has a negative effect on time horizon is rejected. 
Instead, we find a significant positive relationship between company size and time horizon. 
Furthermore, although tests on the significance of mediation paths show that time horizon 
significantly mediates the influence of price competition and technological competition on 
CSP, the magnitude of these effects are relatively small. 
These findings provide further empirical support for the hypothesis that long time 
orientation encourages CSP. This has important policy implications, both at the institutional 
level and at the intermediate level of industrial organisations. At the institutional level, 
governments should seek to enforce the time horizon of companies, for example by 
stimulating long term shareholdership for large companies and stimulating credit suppliers of 
SMEs to consider the long term potential of companies financers of credit. By strengthening 
the commitment and involvement of financers with the company, they will have more insight 
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into and be more sensitive to the benefits of long term investments, such as investments in 
CSP. At the level of industrial organizations, norm setting for corporate governance can 
contribute to a long term orientation of large companies and SMEs. Sacrificing long-term 
prospects to meet quarterly earnings expectations can be reduced by proper executive 
compensation schemes that make remuneration dependent on long instead of short term 
financial performance (Mallin et al., 2013).  
Furthermore, the finding that the intensity of price competition reduces the time 
horizon of companies and hence indirectly discourages CSP may have implications for 
competition policy. The aim of anti-trust policy to increase consumer welfare by intensifying 
market competition may collide with other government policies that aim at fostering CSP in 
order to meet sustainability goals. Although the indirect effects of the intensity of price 
competition and level playing field market position on CSP is relatively small, we have also 
detected direct negative effects from a level playing field on CSP. In combination with the 
finding that the intensity of technological competition fosters CSP directly as well as 
indirectly through time horizon, we conclude that, from the perspective of CSP, the 
government should focus on policies that foster technological competition, such as tax 
incentives for the venture capital industry, rather than price competition. 
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1
 In literature, CSP is often distinguished from its sister concept CSR because most of the many different 
definitions of CSR that are used in the literature depend on motivation,  meaning that it is the intent of an activity 
which counts (Crane et al., 2008). CSP is defined in terms of the observed CSR policies, processes and outcomes 
of a company’s activities (Crane et al., 2008). As we use data to measure CSR and do not measure motivations, 
we stick to the term ‘CSP’ in our paper.  
